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Loyalty and Deference at Oral Arguments: An
Empirical Examination of How Supreme Court
Justices Treat Solicitors General
Amanda C. Bryan, Charles Gregory, and Timothy R. Johnson*
It is well documented that when the Office of the Solicitor General
argues before the United States Supreme Court it is widely successful.
Scholars have taken this success as evidence that the Court is
deferential to the Solicitor General’s office. This Article argues,
however, that success is not synonymous with deference. Instead, by
examining how the Justices treat the Solicitor General and deputies,
this Article develops a more nuanced measure of deference to explain
how and why the Court treats the Solicitor General differently than it
treats other attorneys who appear before the nation’s highest court.
This Article uses this measure to test competing explanations of
Solicitor General influence and overcome the observational
equivalence between success and deference that beleaguers previous
research. The results of this study support the argument that, during
oral arguments, Justices on the Court are more deferential over time to
the Solicitor General of the President who appointed him or her, than
toward other Solicitors General.
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INTRODUCTION
During oral arguments in King v. Burwell,1 Justice Antonin Scalia made
no secret that he disagreed with the arguments put forth by Solicitor
General Donald B. Verrilli Jr., who was responsible for defending
President Barack Obama’s signature healthcare law.2 At one point during
an interaction between the two, Justice Scalia said: “Well, I disagree with
that.’’3 Perhaps more interesting is the harsh language Justice Scalia used
to characterize the Solicitor General’s response to a question concerning
state-established healthcare exchanges: describing the response as
“gobbledygook.’’4 Without question, these interactions demonstrate
1. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq.).
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
4. Id. at 65. The answer Verrilli offered was, as follows:
GENERAL VERRILLI: So [. . .] no. I think the right way to think about this, Justice
Alito, is that what’s going on here is that [. . .] the right place to focus, let me put it that
way. The right place to focus here is not on the who, but on the what; on the thing that
gets set up and whether it qualifies as an Exchange established by the State, and these
Exchanges do qualify. And the reason they qualify is because they fulfill the requirement
in Section 1311(b)(1) that each state shall establish an Exchange. And 1321 tells you
that because it says to the HHS that . . . when a State hasn’t elected to meet the Federal
requirements, HHS steps in, and what the HHS does is set up the required Exchange. It
says such Exchange, which is referring to the [. . .] immediately prior to the required
Exchange where the only Exchange required in the Act is an Exchange under Section
1311(b)(1). So it has to be that . . . what HHS is doing under the plain text of the statute
is fulfilling the requirement of the Section 1311(b)(1) that each State establish an
Exchange, and for that reason we say it qualifies as an Exchange established by the State.
That’s reinforced, as Justice Breyer suggested earlier, by the definition which says that
an Exchange is an Exchange established under Section 1311. 1311, again, has 1311(b)(1)
which says each State shall establish an Exchange. And it has to be that way because
Petitioners have conceded, and it’s at page 22 of their brief, that an Exchange that HHS
sets up is supposed to be the same Exchange that Petitioners say function just like an
Exchange that the State sets up for itself.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, you’re putting a lot of weight on the . . . one word, such, such
Exchange. . . . [I]t seems to me the most unrealistic interpretation of “such” to mean the
Federal government shall establish a State Exchange. Rather, it seems to me “such”
means an Exchange for the State rather than an Exchange of the State. How can the . . .
Federal government establish a State Exchange. That is gobbledygook. You know,
“such” must mean something different.
GENERAL VERRILLI: It isn’t gobbledygook, Justice Scalia. And I think about it and
I go back to something that Justice Alito asked earlier. And that [. . .] if the language of
36B were exactly the same as it is now, and the statute said in 1321 that an Exchange . .
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Justice Scalia’s clear opposition to the Solicitor General’s position—
opposition he reiterated in his dissenting opinion.5 But the interactions
between Justice Scalia and the Solicitor General stand in stark contrast to
how the two Justices appointed by President Obama—Justice Sonia
Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan—addressed the Solicitor General’s
argument.
Justice Sotomayor asked the Solicitor General fewer than a handful of
questions and her comments during the King oral arguments and questions
toward Verrilli lacked the acerbic language that accompanied Justice
Scalia’s remarks.6 This was rather surprising because, for most of her
career as a federal judge and Supreme Court Justice, Justice Sotomayor
cultivated a reputation as a jurist who asks pointed questions and dominates
oral arguments. But during the Solicitor General’s argument in King, she
was uncharacteristically silent and gentle. Justice Elena Kagan was equally
as sanguine about Verrilli’s argument. But what led Justices Scalia,
Sotomayor, and Kagan to treat the Solicitor General in the different ways
that they did?
To answer this question, this Article begins with the notion that oral
arguments are one of the few times the United States Supreme Court
interacts with the public. In fact, these interactions are the first time the
Justices discuss a case with one another and the only time they discuss
the case with the advocates for each side. The quality of such
discussions is important because they are finite—each side only gets
thirty minutes—and because they are public. Specifically, oral
arguments introduce the case and, oftentimes, the Justices to the
American people. Thus, how the Justices choose to treat the advocates
before them can, and does, have important implications for how the
Court is understood and how effectively the Justices are able to gather
the information they need to decide America’s most important legal
controversies.
In addition, this Article situates its argument within the broader
literature that seeks to explain how the Court interacts with the executive
. set up by HHS shall qualify as an Exchange established by the State for purposes of
Section 1311, you wouldn’t change the language of 36B one iota, and that wouldn’t be
any doubt in anyone’s mind that the . . . subsidies were available on Federal Exchanges.
And what we’re saying is that effectively reading 1311 and 1321 together, that is what
the statute does. And that is certainly . . . a reasonable reading of the statute. It is really
the only reading of the statute that allows you to be faithful to the text of 1311(b)(1), the
word “shall,” and to the Tenth Amendment.
Id. at 64–66.
5. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496–507 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, 48, 72, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No.14-114).
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branch within the system of separated powers, specifically through its
interactions with the Solicitor General when he or she, or someone from
his or her office, appears before the Court. This literature suggests that,
for a variety of reasons, the Solicitor General clearly has a special
relationship with the Court.7 This Article attempts to tease apart the
competing theories of Solicitor General influence by analyzing a more
nuanced form of deference than is typical. In particular, it posits that,
instead of merely analyzing the success of the Solicitor General on the
merits before the Court—or his or her success in convincing the Court
to grant or deny certiorari in a given case—deference should be
measured by how the Justices treat the Solicitor General in the one
public aspect of the Court’s decision-making process—oral arguments.
Most specifically, then, this Article sheds light on whether Justices
are more deferential to the Solicitor General of the President who
appointed him or her during oral arguments. To test this claim, it
utilizes data from 1986–2006 in an effort to determine how the Justices
treat attorneys who appear before the Court. In so doing, this Article
follows the lead of Black, Treul, et al. (2011)8 and Johnson et al.
(2009)9 to compare the number of questions asked by Justices to
Solicitors General and the emotional sentiment of such questions. Most
specifically, it expects Justices to be more deferential to the emissaries
of the President to whom they owe their seat, than to other Solicitors
General or attorneys.
Part I of this Article establishes why Supreme Court oral arguments
are so important to the Justices’ decision-making process and how
Justices treat attorneys during these proceedings affects cases’
outcomes. Part II turns to the Court’s place in the federal system of
separated powers. From there, Part III specifically considers the
existing literature on the Court’s relationship with the Solicitor General.
Next, Part IV builds the argument that deference should be understood
as how the Justices treat the Solicitor General during oral arguments
rather than whether the Solicitor General actually wins cases when he or
7. RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 7–9 (2012) (discussing
reasons for the Solicitor General’s success). See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 7 (1987) (“[T]he influence of the Solicitor at the
Court goes beyond helping the Justices set their docket.”).
8. Ryan C. Black, Sarah A. Treul, Timothy R. Johnson & Jerry Goldman, Emotions, Oral
Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 73 J. POL. 572, 577 (2011) [hereinafter Black,
Treul, et al.].
9. Timothy R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands
with Questions at Oral Arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241,
242 (2009).
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she appears before the Court. Part V discusses the data used to test this
assertion as well as the variables employed in the models. Finally, Part
VI presents the results and offers some remarks about why this measure
provides the best picture of how and why the Supreme Court
demonstrates deference to the Solicitor General and, in turn, to the
executive branch of the United States.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS
Conventional wisdom in judicial politics suggests that oral arguments
presented to the Supreme Court generally have no impact on how the
Justices decide. As Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth argue, there is no
indication oral argument “regularly, or even infrequently, determines who
wins and who loses.”10 David Rohde and Spaeth assert oral arguments
have little influence on the outcome of a case because Justices’ voting
preferences are stable.11 As evidence that Justices do not think about these
proceedings as they decide the legal and policy issues of a case, Segal and
Spaeth reference Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.’s copious conference notes
that make almost no references to oral argument.12 This is important for
their contention because the conference—where Justices cast initial votes
in a case—occurs within a day or so of when Justices sit for oral arguments.
In short, Segal and Spaeth suggest that if none of the Justices used the
words “oral argument” during private conference discussions then the
proceedings in open court must not affect the outcome of the case.13
Generally, then, for Rohde and Spaeth and Segal and Spaeth, Justices’
votes will not change as a result of what transpires during a one-hour
exchange between the Court and counsel.14
The Justices themselves contest this notion. Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes claimed that oral arguments helped the Court “separate the wheat
from the chaff.”15 In 1955, Justice John Marshall Harlan explained that
the view that oral arguments do not “count” was a “greatly mistaken
one.”16 He viewed oral arguments as “perhaps the most effective weapon”

10. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 280 (2002).
11. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 155 (1976).
12. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 10, at 280.
13. Id.
14. ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 11, at 155.
15. DAVID C. FREDERICK, THE ART OF ORAL ADVOCACY 3 (2d. ed. 2011).
16. John M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?, 41
CORNELL L.Q. 6, 6 (1955).
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that appellate attorneys have.17 Contemporary Justices share this opinion.
Chief Justice John Roberts has called these proceedings “terribly, terribly
important,” and Justice Scalia, who once called them a “dog and pony
show,” tempered his view and admitted that “things can be put into
perspective during oral arguments in a way that they can’t in a written
brief.”18
There is now a substantial body of research to suggest that the Justices
are correct in their assertion that oral arguments play a pivotal role in the
Supreme Court’s decision-making process.19 Indeed, although difficult to
study, these proceedings have been the subject of scholarly inquiry for
decades. Early analyses, however, used mostly anecdotal evidence to
support such a hypothesis. Arthur Miller and Jerome Barron, for example,
used anecdotes from notable Supreme Court cases to demonstrate how the
Justices “can subtly steer counsel beyond the frontiers of traditional
doctrine” and subsequently push the law closer to the Justices’ preferences
and beyond the boundaries presented in the litigants’ briefs.20
In addition, Wasby et al. (1976) used examples from cases dealing with
racial equality and desegregation in the mid-twentieth century to suggest
that the Justices’ behavior at oral argument could reveal their strategies and
preferences in ways that opaque written opinions could not.21 Their
analysis of the deliberate sample of cases, for example, indicated that the
Justices’ “questions” were often more appropriately deemed
“statements.”22 Wasby et al. (1976) further noted that the Justices
appeared to be negotiating over the legal and policy ramifications of the
case with each other, rather than having a back-and-forth conversation with
the lawyers.23 Because there was a strong parallel between the Justices’
questions during oral argument and their final decisions on the merits,
Wasby et al. (1976) suggested that their behavior during oral argument
could be used to better understand the Justices’ strategies and
17. Id. at 11.
18. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 260
(Aaron Javiscas et al. eds., 9th ed. 2011); John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Reemergence
of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 69 (2005).
19. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 97–99 (2004) (finding that Supreme Court opinions are
influenced by oral argument); Timothy R. Johnson et al., The Influence of Oral Argument on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 113 (2006).
20. Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and
the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1210 (1975).
21. Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Functions of Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court, 62
Q.J. SPEECH 410, 411 (1976).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 418.
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preferences.24
Similarly, E. Barrett Prettyman Jr. conducted a somewhat random
analysis of oral arguments to find instances in which the Justices posed
hypothetical questions to the litigants.25 He concluded, similar to Wasby
et al. (1976), that the Justices were using hypotheticals not only to test the
policy implications of their decision, but also to engage in a kind of “preconference” discussion with their fellow Justices.26
Schubert et al. (1992) provided the first generalizable account of oral
arguments.27 Schubert et al. (1992) studied the transcripts and audio
recordings of 300 randomly selected oral arguments and looked at word
usage, pitch, other acoustical components of the Justices’ speech, as well
as the types of arguments the Justices made.28 They were primarily
focused on two related goals: (1) demonstrating that oral arguments matter
to the Justices and (2) that observational methods can, and should, be used
to rigorously study these proceedings.29 While they were semi-successful,
their work never got fully off the ground.30
Despite these early accounts, the vast majority of what society knows
about oral arguments comes from analyses conducted over the past fifteen
years.31 This work over the past fifteen years has firmly established that
these proceedings are a pivotal stage in the Court’s decision-making
process for three reasons: (1) the Justices use oral arguments to gather
information relevant to their decision-making task; (2) oral arguments can
directly influence and persuade the Justices during the proceedings; and (3)
given the essential nature that these proceedings play in the Court’s
decision-making process, a significant body of research has established
that the Justices’ behavior during oral arguments is predictive of how they
will ultimately decide cases they hear. In Part I.A, Part I.B., and Part I.C.,
this Article discusses the research that focuses on each of these specific
areas of analysis.

24. Id. at 420–22.
25. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Use of Hypothetical Questions at Oral
Argument, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 555, 556 (1984).
26. Id.
27. James N. Schubert et al., Observing Supreme Court Oral Argument: A Biosocial Approach,
11 POL. & LIFE SCI. 35, 36 (1992).
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 51.
31. See text accompanying note 19 (discussing the pivotal role oral arguments play in Supreme
Court decisions).
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A. Oral Arguments as an Information Gathering Tool
The Justices have access to a substantial amount of information in the
form of litigant and amicus curiae briefs. These briefs serve to inform the
Justices about the legal merits of various arguments and the policy and
strategic implications of potential outcomes.32 As Timothy Johnson notes,
however, the Justices are passive recipients of this information: they do not
directly control what the parties include in their briefs.33 As a result, oral
arguments play an essential role in the Justices’ decision-making process
because these proceedings represent the first and best opportunity the
Justices have to actively seek out information they deem relevant to their
decision-making process.
Justice Harlan argued that oral arguments offer an opportunity for the
Court and counsel to engage in a joint effort to “search out the truth both
as to the facts and the law.”34 Early Court-watchers also seized upon the
fact that the Justices raised novel issues in oral argument in an attempt to
use litigants to better understand the legal merits and policy implications
of various arguments.35 In fact, studies on attorney quality demonstrate
that more experienced attorneys are more persuasive—at least in part—
because they are better able to reduce the cost Justices must pay to
obtaining information.36 Kevin McGuire argues that Justices need
“reliable information-data and clarity about the nature of the legal
principles in conflict that will enable them to maximize their policy designs
in the most informed manner.”37
Oral arguments are not just about discussing legal principles. As policymaximizing actors, the Justices require information about the potential
policy implications of their decision.38 Because they require the other
branches to implement their opinions, the Justices also need information
about the preferences of external actors and how the other branches may
respond to their decisions.39 Oral arguments, then, provide an invaluable
32. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence
of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL. RES. Q. 55, 56–57 (2007).
33. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 101–02.
34. Harlan, supra note 16, at 7.
35. ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 11, at 60.
36. Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers
in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187, 189 (1995); Roberts, supra note 18, at 79.
37. Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES.
Q. 505, 522 (1998).
38. Michael A. Bailey et al., Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor
General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72, 73 (2005).
39. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 138–39 (1998); Timothy
R. Johnson, The Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, and the Separation of Powers, 31 AM.
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source of information on both those fronts.
Johnson explicitly tests whether the Justices use oral arguments to seek
out information that is not contained in the briefs by content coding the
questions raised during the proceedings and comparing them to the issues
included in the litigants’ and amici briefs.40 Specifically, he finds that the
Justices use oral argument to “obtain information beyond that which is
provided by the parties” to the case and, more specifically, that they use
oral argument to ascertain their policy options, aid them in understanding
the preferences of external actors, and determine how those actors may
respond to the Court’s decision.41 James C. Philips and Edward L. Carter
similarly suggest that the Justices seek out novel information during oral
argument and that this behavior has actually increased over time.42
Eve M. Ringsmuth and Johnson validate these findings and offer further
evidence that the Court behaves strategically during oral argument as the
Justices are more likely to seek out information about Congress and its
preferences when the Court is constrained (i.e., ideologically distant
relative to the median members of both chambers of Congress).43 Black et
al. (2013) add evidence that the Justices are more actively engaged in
seeking out information during oral argument in cases that are politically
salient to them personally.44
Generally, then, oral arguments are a pivotal step in the Court’s
decision-making process because they provide the Justices with an
opportunity to seek out new information that is relevant to their decisionmaking tasks. The Justices use these proceedings to ask the litigants about
the legal merits of their arguments and to help them understand the
potential policy implications of different case outcomes. Further, argument
sessions help the Justices better understand how external actors might
respond to the decisions they will ultimately make.
B. Oral Argument and Persuasion
Certainly the previous sections indicate Justices can and do use oral
arguments to gain information that will help decide cases they hear, but the
POL. RES. 426, 428 (2003).
40. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 55.
41. Id. at 55–56.
42. James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Source of Information or “Dog and Pony Show”?
Judicial Information Seeking During U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument, 1963–1965 & 2004–
2009, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 107, 151 (2010).
43. Eve M. Ringsmuth & Timothy R. Johnson, Supreme Court Oral Arguments and
Institutional Maintenance, 41 AM. POL. RES. 651, 660 (2013).
44. Ryan C. Black et al., Toward an Actor-Based Measure of Supreme Court Case Salience:
Information-Seeking and Engagement During Oral Arguments, 66 POL. RES. Q. 804, 812 (2013).
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key question is whether they are actually persuaded by arguments
presented to them during these proceedings. Or, are oral arguments simply
the “dog and pony show” as Justice Scalia suspected early in his career?
While Segal and Spaeth suggest Justices may not be persuaded to vote
in a given way based on what transpires during oral arguments, the Justices
tend to disagree with this assessment.45 For instance, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg once cautioned that though not many cases are won based on the
oral argument alone, a party can lose a case at oral argument.46 In addition,
former Chief Justice William Rehnquist made similarly restrained
comments about the probability that a Justice changes his or her vote based
on oral argument when he admitted that oral argument “does make a
difference.”47 He said: “I think . . . [i]n a significant minority of the cases
in which I have heard oral argument, I have left the bench feeling
differently about the case than I did when I came on the bench.”48 Recent
research has focused on how and when oral arguments might play a role in
altering or even changing the Justices’ decisions on a case. Scholars
demonstrate at least two ways that oral arguments can alter the Justices’
votes: (1) these proceedings might provide unique information that clarifies
the legal or policy elements of a case, and (2) these proceedings might
influence the Justices’ votes by altering the frame or dominant issue of the
case.49
The first way that oral arguments might serve to persuade the Justices is
by providing them with novel information that alters their view of the case.
As discussed above, these proceedings serve the important function of
providing the Justices with relevant information about the legal and policy
elements of a case as well as about the preferences of actors external to the
Court.50 The Justices might have strong and unwavering preferences, but,
unless one assumes they are perfectly informed, the Justices might need
additional information to determine the potential ideological impact of
their decision. Oral arguments provide litigants an opportunity to supply
the Justices with the information they need to translate their preferences
into law.
For instance, McGuire suggests that more experienced litigants have a
45. FREDERICK, supra note 15, at 3–5; Harlan, supra note 16, at 6–9.
46. Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567, 569 (1999).
47. Roberts, supra note 18, at 80 n.8.
48. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 243 (1987).
49. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 111–12; Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court Litigants and
Strategic Framing, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 617–18 (2010).
50. See supra Part I.A (discussing the importance of oral arguments as an information
gathering tool).
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greater probability of winning than their similarly situated, but less
experienced, peers.51 He argues this is because repeat players are better
able to provide the Justices with essential information about the legal and
policy merits of the case.52 Although McGuire does not differentiate
between the information litigants provide in their briefs and in their oral
argument, his findings provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that
arguments made at oral argument can be persuasive.53 Indeed, if the
Justices had strong and unwavering prior beliefs about the case, the quality
of information provided by attorneys would have little to no effect on the
Justices’ votes.54
Regardless of the specific quality of attorneys who appear, Johnson
offers evidence that information presented during oral arguments uniquely
influences the Justices’ votes.55 He hypothesizes that if oral arguments
play a significant role in how the Justices make their decisions, then
information from these proceedings should feature prominently in the
Court’s eventual opinions.56 To test this claim, Johnson tabulates the
arguments raised in litigant and amicus briefs as well as the arguments
raised during oral arguments.57 He then tracks which arguments found
their way into the Court’s eventual majority opinion.58 The results
demonstrate that the Justices make statistically and substantively
significant use of information that emanates only from oral arguments.59
Hence, these proceedings can and do produce useful information that
Justices use to form their beliefs and preferences about the case and
therefore alter their legal and policy decisions.60
The second way that oral arguments may influence the Justices’ votes is
by altering the frame or dominant issue of the case. By analyzing how
litigants and the lower courts frame their arguments, Justin Wedeking finds
that external actors’ behavior can impact the Justices’ decisions.61 Because
petitioners lost at the lower court level, they have a strategic incentive to
provide an alternative frame of the case when appearing before the
51. McGuire, supra note 37, at 522–23.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 10, at 280 (considering the extent to which an oral
argument may or may not sway a Justice’s vote in a case).
55. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 108.
56. Id. at 111.
57. Id. at 104–07.
58. Id. at 111.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 111–12.
61. Wedeking, supra note 49, at 617–19.
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Supreme Court—to adopt the same frame used in the lower court would be
to present a view that has already lost.62 Wedeking finds that, all else
equal, when the petitioner uses an alternative frame from the lower court
decision, the petitioner increases his or her odds of winning the case.63
This suggests that changing the rhetorical dimension of the case can lead
to a more favorable interpretation “just enough to change the political
outcome from an apparent loss to a victory.”64 Wedeking suggests that this
finding is consistent with Herbert Kritzer and Mark Richard’s analysis on
the constraining force of the law on judicial decisions.65 Per Kritzer and
Richards, the Justices feel constrained to operate within an established
jurisprudential regime—if a litigant can shift the debate to one issue that is
more favorable to him or her (e.g., altering the level of scrutiny), he or she
might be able “to snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat.”66
The Justices also use this sort of heresthetical maneuvering during oral
arguments to alter case outcomes. Analyzing the Justices’ behavior during
these proceedings between 1998 and 2006, Black, Schutte, et al. (2013)
demonstrate that a Justice is more likely to raise and discuss threshold
issues (e.g., whether the case was moot) when the most likely result on the
case’s merits deviated from the Justice’s preferred policy outcome.67
Similarly, if a Justice knew that the case would likely be resolved in a
fashion that is inconsistent with his or her preferences, a Justice is more
likely to push his or her colleagues to dispose of the case on a threshold
issue.68 This finding is consistent with experimental research into
motivated reasoning and legal decision making.69 The bottom line is that,
by reframing the issues during oral arguments, the litigants and Justices can
alter the debate and, in some instances, alter the outcome of the case as
well.
Finally, by piecing together various thread of research, Johnson et al.

62. Id. at 619.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision
Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 306 (2002); Wedeking, supra note 49, at 618 n.5.
66. Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the U.S. Supreme Court, 14
J. THEORETICAL POL. 93, 110 (2002).
67. Ryan C. Black, Rachel A. Schutte & Timothy R. Johnson, Trying to Get What You Want:
Heresthetical Maneuvering and U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, 66 POL. RES. Q. 819, 819–
21 (2013) [hereinafter Black, Schutte, et al.].
68. Id. at 819.
69. Eileen Braman, Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in
Legal Decision Making, 68 J. POL. 308, 310 (2006).
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(2006) provide compelling evidence that oral arguments matter.70 They
systematically code Justice Harry Blackmun’s grades of attorney quality
during oral argument and show, first, that he tended to give better grades
to lawyers who possess characteristics that are typically associated with
high-quality advocates. Specifically, he tended to give better grades to
attorneys with more litigating experience or attorneys who attended elite
law schools.71 Second, Blackmun’s grades were significant predictors of
how the Court would vote even when controlling for other legally and
attitudinally relevant variables and even when controlling for those same
background characteristics used to determine that Blackmun’s grades were
not randomly assigned.72 In confirmation of these findings, Ringsmuth et
al. (2013) analyze the pre- and post-oral argument notes of Justice Powell
and Justice Blackmun and find that the Justices altered their disposition
about a case due in part to the arguments raised in oral argument.73 Better
performance of an attorney during oral arguments—either by providing
high-quality information or strategically reframing the case—clearly
seems to increase the odds that the litigant will win the case.
C. Oral Arguments and Predicting Case Outcomes
Most importantly, this Article next considers whether what transpires
during oral arguments can help scholars predict which side will actually
win a case. Recall that oral arguments provide the Justices with important
and unique information that can persuade the Justices to change their views
and ultimate decisions in a case.74 Given the pivotal role that these
proceedings play in the Court’s decision-making process, it should not be
surprising to find that Court-watchers can use oral arguments to predict
how the Court will rule in a given case.
Very early on in the study of oral arguments, scholars knew, or at least
suspected, that the Justices’ behavior during these proceedings could signal
their eventual votes. Wasby et al. (1976) and Donald Cohen, for example,
conducted qualitative assessments of the Justices’ behavior during these
proceedings and noted that the Justices’ questions and statements closely
mirrored the outcome and analysis used to justify that outcome in the
Court’s written opinions.75 Linda Greenhouse noted that she could
70. Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 104.
71. Id. at 105–06.
72. Id. at 107–08.
73. Eve M. Ringsmuth et al., Voting Fluidity and Oral Argument on the U.S. Supreme Court,
66 POL. RES. Q. 429, 431–40 (2013).
74. See supra Part I.B (explaining the persuasiveness of oral arguments).
75. Donald S. Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States Supreme Court Advocacy: An
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outperform statistical models of Supreme Court decision making and legal
experts due, at least in part, from her ability to make inferences about the
Justices’ behavior during oral arguments.76 The question becomes whether
the Justices systematically telegraph their intent in such a way that can be
captured through methodical data collection.
Early analyses based on small samples of cases determined that the
Justices speak at different rates from each other and at different rates
between cases, providing a useful variable to determine, from a
quantitative level, whether the Justices’ behavior can be used to predict
their votes.77 A smattering of studies used this intuition to conduct smalln quantitative analyses of cases to determine whether the rate at which
Justices speak is predictive of how they will vote. Sarah Shullman, for
example, watched ten oral arguments and coded each of the Justices’
comments based on how “helpful” or “hostile” their comments were to the
litigant.78 She noted that the Justices generally asked more hostile
questions than friendly questions, that they specifically asked more hostile
questions of the litigant who would go on to lose, and that they generally
asked more questions (helpful or hostile) of litigants who ultimately lost
the case.79 Chief Justice Roberts conducted a similar analysis of fourteen
cases from 1980 and fourteen cases from 2003.80 He found that the litigant
who was asked the most questions lost in twenty-four of those twenty-eight
cases.81
Lawrence Wrightsman analyzed a non-random sample of twelve
“ideological” cases and twelve “non-ideological” cases from the October
2004 term.82 He defined an ideological case as one that should “trigger a
value-laden bias in a justice.”83 His analysis largely confirmed what
Shullman and Justice Roberts found: the side receiving more questions lost
in seven of the twelve “ideological cases”—cases that are probably more

Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
89, 110 (1978); Wasby et al., supra note 21, at 411–12.
76. Linda Greenhouse, Press Room Predictions, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 781, 781–82 (2004).
77. See Wasby et al., supra note 21, at 413–14 (discussing the rates at which the Justices ask
questions as a means of determining the effectiveness of oral argument).
78. Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusion of Devil’s Advocacy: How the Justices of the Supreme
Court Foreshadow Their Decisions During Oral Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271, 273
(2004).
79. Id. at 274.
80. Roberts, supra note 18, at 75.
81. Id.
82. LAWRENCE. S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: AN
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 137–38 (2008).
83. Id. at 137.
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controversial for the Court.84 This number dramatically decreased,
however, in the “non-ideological cases”—where he could predict the
winner in only three of the twelve cases.85
Johnson et al. (2009) conducted the first systematic, large-n analysis
used to determine whether the Justices’ behavior during oral arguments is
predictive of their final votes by studying all oral argument transcripts
during the 1979 to 1995 Court terms.86 They note that the mean number
of questions asked per case increased over that time period from a
minimum of slightly above eighty questions per case in 1985 to a
maximum of 147 questions per case in 1995.87 Further, they found that the
average number of words uttered by the Justices during these proceedings
increased from about 2,000 words per oral argument at the tail end of the
Burger Court to over 2,800 words per oral argument in the early 1990s.88
Importantly, Johnson et al. (2009) demonstrate that the relative number
of questions and words directed at the two sides is a statistically and
substantively significant predictor in determining which side will win a
case.89 Indeed, when controlling for the Justices’ ideological preferences
and other relevant variables (such as the Solicitor General and interest
group participation) multivariate analysis indicates that there is a .64
probability of reversal when the Justices ask the same number of questions
of each side but only a .39 probability of reversal when the Justices ask the
petitioner fifty more questions than the respondent.90 They find a similar
pattern when analyzing the number of words spoken by the Justices during
each side’s argument.91
Johnson et al. (2009)’s large-n, quantitative study indicates that the
Justices’ behavior during oral arguments is highly predictive of their final
votes.92 It also demonstrates that scholars can use simple observational
data to make such predictions. Subsequent analysis has delved deeper into
the theory and data to generate more qualitatively rich accounts of the
Justices’ behavior. For example, drawing on the fields of social
84. Id. at 140–41; see Shullman, supra note 78, at 278–79 (finding that Justices ultimately asked
less questions at oral argument of the subsequently prevailing party); see also Roberts, supra note
18, at 75 (discussing the number of questions litigants received from the Justices then comparing
that to the case’s outcome).
85. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 82, at 141.
86. Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 250.
87. Id. at 252.
88. Id. at 253.
89. Id. at 257.
90. Id. at 258.
91. Id. at 259.
92. Id. at 260–61.
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psychology and linguistics, Black, Treul, et al. (2011) hypothesize that the
Justices are likely to exhibit their preferences and views through the
emotional content of their language during oral argument.93 If the Justices
have a preference, especially a strong preference, their “words, and the
emotions behind them,” can provide observers valuable insights into the
Justices’ “intentions, motives, and desires.”94
Ultimately, the public discussion that transpires at oral arguments can
help scholars predict case outcomes. Combined with the other advantages
of these proceedings, it is clear that oral arguments are, and should be, an
important part of the Court’s decision-making process.
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, EXECUTIVE SANCTIONS, AND THE
COURT
Within the context of oral arguments and the decision-making process
more generally, Supreme Court Justices attempt to rule as closely as
possible to their most preferred goals. At the same time, however, their
decisions are constrained.95 As they pursue policy goals, Justices pay
attention to the preferences of external actors—especially those of the
current Congress and executive branch. As Lee Epstein and Jack Knight
point out: “To create efficacious law—that is, policy that the other
branches will respect and with which they will comply—Justices must
take into account the preferences and expected actions of these
government actors.”96 In other words, Justices on the Court act
strategically when dealing with the other branches. This Part provides an
argument about why the Justices must be specifically cognizant of the
executive branch’s preferences.
Generally, Supreme Court Justices account for how the executive
branch may react to decisions because the President can sanction the
Court in a number of ways if he, or an agency, does not agree with their
decisions. This Article focuses on three sanctions that might come into
play: (1) executive agencies or the President might choose not to enforce
the Court’s decisions, (2) executive agencies or the President can support
anti-Court action in Congress, and (3) the President or agencies may
publically criticize or withdraw support if they disagree with the Court’s
decisions.
93. Black, Treul, et al., supra note 8, at 577.
94. STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 267 (4th
ed. 1993).
95. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 39, at 138; FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW
ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 18–19 (2000).
96. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 39, at 138.
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First, although executive agencies have the power to enforce the
Court’s decisions, they do not have to do so. As Epstein and Walker note,
“[t]he bureaucracy can assist the Court in implementing its policies, or it
can hinder the Court by refusing to do so, a fact of which the Justices are
well aware.”97 While scholars debate about whether the President fully
controls the bureaucracy and uses it for his political advantage, Terry
Moe demonstrates that Presidents have some control over independent
commissions.98 Thus, even though a President might not be able to
unilaterally order an agency to disregard a Court decision, the threat is
real, and has been carried out in the past. For instance, Stephen L. Wasby
notes that the Reagan administration had a policy of “nonacquiescence”
for judicial decisions that it disliked, especially in social security cases.99
While the President might not have absolute control over the
bureaucracy, he or she can personally sanction the Court by refusing to
enforce its decisions. The most oft-cited example of this behavior is
President Jackson’s response to a Court decision that he particularly
disliked: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce
it.”100 Other confrontations demonstrate that the President can, and does,
judge whether the Court has made the right decision. For instance,
President Jackson vetoed a bill that established a national bank even after
the Court declared such an entity constitutional.101 Several years later
President Lincoln defied the Taney Court by refusing to release an
alleged traitor, imprisoned while the right of habeas corpus was
suspended, even though the Court ordered him to do so.102 This concern
about enforcement is not relegated to the 19th century. Rather, Craig R.
Ducat notes Justice Frankfurter’s concern when the Court decided Brown
v. Board of Education:103 “Nothing could be worse from my point of
view than for this Court to make an abstract declaration that segregation
is bad and then have it evaded by tricks.”104
Second, beyond refusing enforcement, the administration can support
anti-Court action in Congress if the President or an agency disagrees with

97. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA:
RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 39 (Sarah Calabi et al. eds., 9th ed. 2016).
98. Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 197, 200 (1982).
99. WASBY, supra note 94, at 330.
100. CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 110 (6th ed. 1996).
101. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 9.
102. Johnson, supra note 39, at 431.
103. DUCAT, supra note 100, at 1301.
104. Id. at 110.

(DO NOT DELETE)

456

2/10/2017 1:43 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 48

the Justices’ policy choices.105 Two examples illustrate this tactic:
President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in response to the Justices’
continued rejection of the administration’s New Deal policies and
President Jefferson’s involvement in forwarding the impeachment of
Samuel Chase.106 Third, if they disagree with a Court’s decisions, a
President and his or her advisors can publicly criticize or fail to support
the Court.107 Lawrence Baum argues that President Reagan and his
Justice Department often used the former strategy, while President
Eisenhower used the latter tactic.108
In general, while rarely invoked by the executive branch, the sanctions
delineated here might decrease the Court’s power as the ultimate arbiter
of the law. If an administration refuses to enforce the Justices’ decisions
then the Court is impotent to make or affect policy. Similarly, public
criticism or anti-Court measures can erode the Court’s legitimacy. Thus,
Supreme Court Justices must, on occasion, account for how the executive
branch may react to their decisions, and ensure that they do not stray too
far, too often, from its preferred policy goals. A key way that they can
ensure that they do not do so is by listening to the one part of the executive
that is regularly in the Court—the Solicitor General.
III. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SUPREME
COURT
Certainly the Constitution and the model of separated powers
provide for the federal branches to levy sanctions against one another.
But it is clear that possible presidential sanctions affect the Court. First,
the President can and does levy sanctions against the other branches of
the federal government and even the threat of doing so can be effective.
Indeed, research on the interaction between the President and Congress
shows that the mere threat of a sanction—a veto, for example—can
change congressional decisions.109 Second, there is evidence that
Supreme Court Justices are concerned enough about the preferences of
the President, members of Congress, and other institutions to suggest
they take potential sanctions seriously and act to ensure that possible
threats do not come to fruition. For instance, analysts argue that the
105. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 159 (5th ed. 1995).
106. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 22–23 (1992).
107. BAUM, supra note 105, at 159.
108. Id.
109. CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE
POWER 188 (2000).
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Warren Court remained unanimous on its school integration cases to
ensure the Justices put up as strong an argument as possible so the
executive would effectively enforce the decisions.110 Similarly, the
Court unanimously ruled against the President in United States v.
Nixon111 in an effort to guarantee President Nixon would comply with
its decision.112
In addition, scholars suggest the Justices show deference to the
executive by often ruling in favor of the federal government when the
Solicitor General appears before the Court as either a litigant or as an
amicus curiae.113 Therefore, most studies insinuate that the Court rules
in favor of the government to maintain a strong relationship with the
executive branch.114 The Court can then expect that the vast majority
of its rulings—even if some are out of step with the President’s
preferences—will be enforced.
For example, Bailey et al. (2005) argue that Justices show deference
by accepting cues the Solicitor General sends when he is either a litigant
in a case or when he files as an amicus curiae.115 Interestingly, one of the
key findings of Bailey et al. (2005) is that Justices are especially receptive
to the Solicitor General’s arguments that are ideologically compatible with
the President or with the Solicitor General.116 Bailey et al. (2005) conclude
that the Solicitor General’s influence is clearly political precisely because
he or she is more likely to persuade his or her ideological allies.117
Moreover, there is evidence the Justices defer to the Solicitor General
because the office has a high degree of credibility with the Court,118 it
provides the best legal arguments,119 and its attorneys have the most
experience.120 Indeed, studies demonstrate that the Justices might show
deference to the Solicitor General by inviting him or her to appear at
110. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
55 (Simon & Schuster 1979).
111. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 684, 716 (1974).
112. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 244 (6th ed. 2007).
113. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 7, at 36.
114. But see Johnson, supra note 39, at 434 (discussing the importance of a strong relationship
between the branches of government).
115. Bailey et al., supra note 38, at 76.
116. Id. at 81.
117. Id. at 83.
118. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 113–14
(1992).
119. Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and
Burger Courts: A Research Note, 41 W. POL. Q. 135, 138 (1988).
120. Miller & Barron, supra note 20, at 1241.
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oral arguments as an amicus curiae.121 While this might not be a typical
way of showing deference, it helps support this Article’s argument
because the Solicitor General is the only attorney who is regularly
invited to appear before the Court when he or she is not already
involved in a case. In short, such invitations suggest that the views of
the executive branch are so important in the eyes of the Justices that
they often bring the Solicitor General to oral arguments to hear those
views.
Other analysts posit that the Justices show deference to the Solicitor
General simply because the Solicitor General possesses a special
relationship with the Justices.122 This view manifests itself in several
ways. First, because scholars refer to the Solicitor General as the “Tenth
Justice,” the nine Supreme Court Justices are simply more likely to
accede to the Solicitor General’s views in cases where the government
appears.123 Second, because the Justices are more likely to rule in favor
of attorneys who appear more often before the Court, and because the
Solicitor General is the quintessential repeat player, the Justices are
likely to defer to the government when it appears.124
Finally, in the most comprehensive analysis of the Solicitor General’s
influence on the Court, Ryan C. Black and Ryan J. Owens find that the
Solicitor General influences every aspect of the Court’s decision-making
process including how the Justices set the agenda, determine who wins a
case, write opinions, and interpret precedent.125 For this Article’s
purposes, Black and Owens make clear that when the Solicitor General
personally appears at oral arguments—as opposed to an assistant Solicitor
General—he or she is significantly more likely to win the case.126
Therefore, it is clear that the Justices certainly show deference to the
Solicitor General in this scenario. As with other analyses, however, Black
and Owens do not explain what might be leading to that deference—
beyond the choice of who argues the case in open Court. The bottom line
is that, for whatever the reason, it is clear that the Court defers to the
Solicitor General’s views, even though that deference only seems to result
in a higher likelihood that the government will win its case.127

121. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 102.
122. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 99 n.9. (1974).
123. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 7, at 34.
124. Id. at 36. See also Galanter, supra note 122, at 112 (analyzing the structure of the legal
system in an attempt to better understand how to effectuate change).
125. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 7, at 54.
126. Id. at 135.
127. Id. at 136.
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While these studies demonstrate that the Justices defer to the
executive, they never fully explain how such deference to the executive
branch actually manifests itself and why. This Article provides this
missing explanation by focusing on a slightly tangential question: Do
Justices have a special relationship with the Presidents who appointed
them?
In answering this question, this Article makes two marked deviations
from the existing literature on the Solicitor General. First, it argues that
Justices are most deferential to Solicitors General to whom they have
some form of preexisting loyalty. That is, they are deferential to the
Solicitors General who serve under the President who appointed them.
In other words, this Article contends that Justices have personal reasons
to respond to the Solicitor General. These personal reasons should
manifest themselves as much in how that Justice treats the Solicitor
General as they do in whether the Solicitor General comes away
victorious. Second, this Article deviates from past literature in that it
looks not at whether the Solicitor General gets what he or she wants, but
rather how the Justices interact with, and treat, the Solicitor General.
Specifically, it contends that deference out of loyalty can best be found
in how the Justices treat attorneys who appear at oral arguments.
IV. A THEORY OF DEFERENCE
The vast majority of existing work that seems to account for the
Supreme Court’s deference toward the Solicitor General focuses solely
on the government’s success before the Court (e.g., having cases placed
on the agenda or winning on the merits). But success and deference are
not synonymous. In fact, it is not possible to equate wins and deference
because of the notion of observational equivalence. For example, many
scholars attribute the “winning result” to a host of other reasons
including: having a stronger case, having support of amici curiae, or
having more experienced counsel making arguments.128 As such, to
really understand the degree to which the Court shows deference to the
Solicitor General, especially of the President who appointed them, one
must look elsewhere. The question remains, therefore: Where should
one turn one’s focus?
This Article focuses on the oral arguments heard in cases the Court
decides. To support this claim, it initially looks beyond judicial politics

128. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 101 (considering the notion of “winning” oral
arguments with respect to their impact on the Justices’ decision-making process); see also
McGuire, supra note 37, at 507 (discussing the need for reliable information to aid the Court in
its ruling).
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and examines social psychology, organizational behavior, and
communications to ascertain the deference in how Justices treat
attorneys who appear before the Court. Specifically, this argument can
be broken down into two complementary points.
First, deference generally comes in how actors—specifically, legal
actors—engage in discussion. Marianne Schmid Mast suggests that
forwarding arguments is an assertive action, but deference, in contrast,
manifests itself with the simple act of listening.129 Mazur et al. (2015)
are even more specific about this relationship as it pertains to
conversation by positing deference as whether an individual is speaking
or listening.130 Mazur et al. (2015) explain that “[i]t is this difference
that explains the generally reliable finding that those of high status
speak more than those of low status.” Thus, the final aspect of
deference manifests itself in both how much someone speaks and how
much those involved in the conversation or debate listen to them; the
more they are allowed to speak, the more deference they are shown.
Beyond just listening, signals of deference include how listeners
actually treat those with whom they are speaking. People often express
deference, for instance, with a willingness to yield to another’s
preferences or opinions as a sign of respect or reverence.131 Yet,
deference is not just yielding to arguments. Rather, scholars argue that
signals of deference convey an acceptance of someone’s position.132
Combined, then, a variety of disciplines demonstrate that listening to
and accepting arguments are clear signals of deference.133
This Article applies this concept of deference to ascertain how the
Supreme Court Justices treat attorneys, specifically those from the

129. Marianne Schmid Mast, Dominance as Expressed and Inferred Through Speaking Time:
A Meta-Analysis, 28 HUM. COMM. RES. 420, 444 (2002).
130. Allan Mazur et al., Does the Biosocial Model Explain the Emergence of Status
Differences in Conversations Among Unacquainted Men?, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2015).
131. Joseph Henrich & Francisco Gil-White, The Evolution of Prestige: Freely Conferred
Deference as a Mechanism for Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural Transmission, 22 EVOLUTION
& HUM. BEHAV. 165, 168 (2001).
132. See, e.g., Alison Fragale, The Power of Powerless Speech: The Effects of Speech Style
and Task Interdependence on Status Conferral, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 243, 252 (2006) (discussing the impact of speech on “status conferral judgments”);
Fiona Lee, Verbal Strategies for Seeking Help in Organizations, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1472, 1479–96 (1999) (discussing the effectiveness of deference on influencing others’ opinions);
Sabrena R. Parton et al., Employment Interview Outcomes and Speech Style Effects, 21 J.
LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 144, 152 (2002) (considering the impact of a “powerful speech
style” on employability).
133. See supra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency to make decisions with the
executive branch’s preferences in mind).
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Solicitor General’s office, during oral arguments. These proceedings
provide an excellent venue to analyze this theory of deference because,
as with the work cited above, oral arguments are truly a conversation
between litigants and Justices about how to decide a case.134 Litigants
are meant to provide arguments while fielding questions from the
bench; therefore, Justices can show deference through how,135 and the
degree to which, they question each attorney who appears.136
Consider the argument that listening more, and allowing a speaker to
say more, is a sign of deference.137 Research on the Supreme Court
suggests such deferential treatment may manifest itself during oral
arguments.138 Indeed, a plethora of studies demonstrates that the
attorney that the Justices ask fewer questions to is much more likely to
win his or her case.139 Combining this argument with the assertions
that the Court is likely to accede to the wishes of the executive,140 this
Article proposes a “Listening Hypothesis”: if the Justices show
deference to the President who appointed them, they should ask fewer
questions of the Solicitors General and Assistant Solicitors General from
that President.
Beyond listening more than questioning to measure deference, this
Article also analyzes the emotive content of the words that the Justices
use in their questions. Specifically, it posits that the reason the Court
is nicer to some attorneys is that the Justices feel a higher sense of
deference toward those attorneys.141 In turn, it is intuitive that being
nicer to one side shows deference to the attorney making the argument.
Again, given the work cited in the previous section, 142 this Article
hypothesizes that the attorney the Court will defer to the most is the
Solicitor General. Though Black, Treul, et al. (2011) demonstrate that
the emotional content of the Justices’ questions can predict the success
of a litigant, their research leaves what causes the emotion as something

134. Harlan, supra note 16, at 7.
135. Black, Treul, et al., supra note 8, at 573.
136. Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 246–49.
137. See Lee, supra note 132, at 1480 (showing that deference is effective in gauging listeners’
acceptance).
138. Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 256.
139. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 82, at 140–41; Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 256; Roberts,
supra note 18, at 75.
140. See supra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency to make decisions with the
executive branch’s preferences in mind).
141. See Black, Treul, et al., supra note 8, at 572–74, 579 (demonstrating that the emotional
content of the Justices’ questions can predict the success of a litigant).
142. See infra Part III (discussing the Solicitor General’s relationship with the Supreme Court).
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of a black box.143 The cause of the emotion is their study’s key
independent variable, rather than the dependent variable. 144 But an
important point in the work of Black, Treul, et al. (2011), and the starting
premise of this Article, is that the relationship between the emotion the
Court directs toward the party and the party’s chance of winning is not
moderated by ideology.145 It is not as simple as the Court being nicer
to the side with whom they already agree. Because Black, Treul, et al.
(2011) do not predict emotion—as it is outside the scope of their
project—they do not answer the important question of why this
relationship exists or determine why the Justices are “nicer” to some
attorneys than others. This Article’s theory of deference, however,
offers an answer by positing that using less negative language toward
an attorney is a sign of deference. Thus it predicts in its “Emotive
Behavior Hypothesis”: if the Justices show deference to the President
who appointed them, they should use less negative language in the
questions asked of the Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors
General from that President.
V. DATA
To test these two hypotheses, this Article relies primarily on data
from two sources. First, for data on how Justices listen to and treat the
Solicitor General at oral arguments, this Articles uses the data created
by Black et al. (2012) who downloaded all available oral argument
transcripts from 1986 to 2006.146 These data provide information
concerning not only the number of questions that the Justices ask, but
also the manner in which Justices treat litigants at these important
proceedings.147 Thus, Black et al. (2012) offer the perfect opportunity
to investigate judicial deference during oral arguments.
Second, for data on case characteristics, this Article turns to the
Supreme Court Database, which remains the cornerstone for examining
the Court’s decision-making process.148 This Article uses these two
data sets to analyze every case decided by the Supreme Court between
the 1986 and 2006 terms. The unit of analysis is each individual Justice
in each case orally argued in front of the Court. More specifically, each

143.
144.
145.
146.

Black, Treul, et al., supra note 8, at 576–79.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 573.
RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE 15 (2012).
147. Id. at 14–16.
148. Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2016 Supreme Court Database, Version 2016 Release 01, SUP. CT.
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
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observation represents how one particular Justice questioned each of
the litigants—petitioner and respondent—involved in each case argued
before the Court.
Because this Article is interested in how Justices listen to and treat
the Solicitor General at oral arguments, it employs two dependent
variables. The first is a count of the number of questions Justices ask
during oral arguments. This variable captures the willingness of
Justices to listen to counsel. As such, fewer questions suggest more
listening and therefore, more deference to a given attorney. The second
dependent measure is the percentage of words that the Justices use in
their questions that are unpleasant (or negative). More precisely, it is
the percentage of negative words individual Justices direct toward
attorneys at oral arguments. Here, this Article suggests that more
negative words signal less deference the Justices give to that
attorney.149
To explain the use of more questions or nicer language toward an
attorney this Article employs several independent variables in the
model. First, it includes a measure for “Appointing President”: a
measure of which President appointed a specific Justice. Recent
research investigates the loyalty of Supreme Court Justices toward the
President who appointed them and finds that Justices are more likely to
support their appointing Presidents.150 Similarly, it is reasonable to
expect Justices will be more deferential toward the Solicitor General of
the President who appointed them. That is, when questioning the
attorney representing the President who appointed them, a Justice will
ask fewer questions and express less negativity. This variable indicates
whether a Justice’s appointing President was in office when the case
was orally argued. Justices whose appointing Presidents were in office
when the case was orally argued are set equal to 1, and 0 otherwise.
149. These measures were originally created by Black, Johnson, and Wedeking (2012) who
used them as independent variables to examine who will prevail on the merits of a case. See
BLACK ET AL., supra note 146, at 15–16. We, however, use them as our point of departure
from previous research. By using these measures as dependent variables, we provide a unique
avenue for studying judicial deference that goes beyond the traditional examination of Justices’
votes on the merits, expecting that Justices will be more deferential towards the Solicitor
General of the President who appointed them. That is, when questioning the attorneys
representing the Presidents who appointed them, Justices will ask fewer questions and express
less negativity towards them. To account for this relationship, we include Appointing
President. This variable indicates whether a Justice’s Appointing President was in office when
the case was orally argued. Justices whose Appointing Presidents were in office when the case
was orally argued are set equal to 1, and 0 otherwise.
150. Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President (Dec. 10,
2015) (manuscript at 12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2702144.
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This Article also includes several traditional Solicitor General
variables in the model. As previously discussed, it is well recognized
that the Solicitor General influences all facets of the Court’s decisionmaking process.151 To account for this influence, this Article includes
three dichotomous variables. First, this Article includes a binary
variable to indicate whether a petitioner or respondent is represented by
the “Office of the Solicitor General.” If the attorney is either the
Solicitor General or Assistant Solicitor General, this variable is set equal
to 1, and 0 otherwise. To be clear, this variable makes no distinction
between Solicitors General or Assistant Solicitors General arguing
before the Supreme Court. Rather, it indicates that the attorney
presenting oral arguments before the Court works for the Office of the
Solicitor General. When the Solicitor General or Assistant Solicitor
General stands before the Court, this Article expects the Justices to be
more deferential to him or her at oral arguments.
Second, this Article includes a binary variable to indicate whether
the attorney is the “Actual Solicitor General.” If the petitioner or
respondent is actually the Solicitor General, this variable is set equal to
1, and 0 otherwise. When the actual Solicitor General participates in
oral arguments, this Article expects the Justices to behave with more
deference to this attorney.
Third, this Article includes a binary variable for “Solicitor General
Invited”: whether the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to
participate as amicus curiae. If the Court invited the Solicitor General
to file an amicus brief, the “Solicitor General Invited” variable is set
equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. The Court invites the Solicitor General to
participate because it respects the role this important office holds in the
federal judicial system. Given this, this Article expects that the Justices
will display more deference at oral arguments when they invite the
Solicitor General to participate as amicus curiae. Overall, it expects
Justices to display higher levels of deference when the Solicitor General
is involved on cases before the Supreme Court.
Finally, the model includes a measure of “Ideological Distance.”
Existing research demonstrates that ideology influences judicial
behavior.152 But ideal point estimates do not exist for attorneys not
representing the Office of the Solicitor General. To work around this
limitation, this Article follows previous research that bases the
ideological position of petitioners and respondents on the lower court
151. See infra Part VI (discussing the Supreme Court’s deference toward the Solicitor General).
152. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L., ECON., & ORG., 303, 305 (2007).

8_JOHNSON_DOCUMENT3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Loyalty and Deference at Oral Arguments

2/10/2017 1:43 PM

465

decision. For example, “if the lower court made a liberal ruling, we
assume the petitioner seeks a conservative outcome and the respondent
seeks a liberal outcome from the Supreme Court.”153 This Article then
defines the position of Justices based on their “Judicial Common
Space” scores and compares the two positions.154 If the lower court
made a liberal decision and a Justice prefers a liberal decision, then the
Justice and petitioner are ideologically compatible but the Justice and
respondent are not—ideologically compatible Justices and attorneys
are coded 1, and 0 otherwise.
Beyond the variables of interest, this Article also includes several
control variables to account for other factors that might influence
deference to the Solicitor General and, in turn, the President. First, it
controls for whether an attorney is the petitioner or respondent; this
variable is coded 1 if the attorney is the petitioner and 0 if the attorney
is the respondent. Although this Article controls for whether an
attorney is the petitioner or respondent, it has no clear expectations on
whether Justices will display more deference toward one side.
To capture the salience of a case, this Article relies on the “Case
Salience Index” created by Collins and Cooper.155 Specifically, it
employs this measure to overcome the limitations that have been
identified as accompanying the salience measure created by using
front-page stories of The New York Times.156 The “Case Salience
Index” employs four newspapers from four regions of America as its
foundation. It codes salience as follows: cases that make the front page
of a paper are coded 2, those covered anywhere in a paper are coded 1,
and those not covered are coded 0. These scores are then summed and
range from 0 to 8.
In addition, this Article includes a second variable to serve as a proxy
153. Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 106–07.
154. Epstein et al., supra note 152, at 304.
155. Todd A. Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience and Media Coverage of
Supreme Court Decisions Toward a New Measure, 65 POL. RES. Q. 396, 400–02 (2012). The
primary measure of salience used by judicial scholars is one that Epstein and Segal created that
indicates whether a case appeared on the front page of New York Times on the day after the
Supreme Court announced its decision. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience,
44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72–73 (2000); see Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates
Across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433,
448 (2007) (including an analysis of Epstein and Segal’s measure of salience); Vanessa A. Baird, The
Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda, 66 J. POL. 755, 760–61
(2004) (same).
156. See, e.g., Isaac Unah & Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case
Salience, and the Attitudinal Model, 28 LAW & POL’Y 295, 304–05 (2006) (discussing possible
biases in Epstein and Segal’s New York Times salience measure).
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for issue salience. In particular, it includes the total number of “Amicus
Briefs” filed in the case. Amicus briefs are recognized as sources of
information for Justices about the importance of a case. For example,
Collins argues that, “amici provide the Justices with myriad
information regarding their perceptions of the correct application of the
law in the case, at the same time highlighting diverse perspectives on
the broader policy concerns implicated by the dispute.”157 Because
amicus briefs aid the Justices in their decision-making duties, this
Article expects Justices to be more amenable to listening, and less
inclined to using unpleasant language, during oral arguments when
there are more amicus briefs in a case.
VI. RESULTS
This Article begins the analysis by examining the willingness of
Justices to extend deference toward litigants who presented oral
arguments before the Supreme Court from 1986 to 2006. To do so, it
models the number of questions Justices ask at oral arguments.
Because the dependent variable is a count variable the coefficient
estimates are based on a Negative Binomial model. Negative binomial
regression is used instead of Poisson regression because it is better able
to account for overdispersion that characterizes the variance of our
dependent variable.158
The results presented in Table 1 provide initial evidence for the
Listening Hypothesis. As expected, the variables Appointing President
and Solicitor General Invited are in the correct direction and reach
acceptable levels of statistical significance. That is, the results show
that when questioning the attorneys representing the Presidents who
appointed them, Justices ask fewer questions to the attorney who
appears from the Solicitor General’s office.

157. PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING 2 (2008).
158. Negative Binomial Regression models account for the overdispersion of zeros in a model
by allowing “the conditional variance of y to exceed its conditional mean.” See, e.g., J. SCOTT
LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 230
(1997).
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TABLE 1: Negative Binomial Regression—Modeling the Number of
Questions by Individual Justices Directed Toward the Solicitor General
(1) Questions b/se
Appointing President

-0.232***
(0.035)

Ideological Compatibility

-0.180***
(0.041)

Office of Solicitor General

0.008
(0.024)

Actual Solicitor General

-0.066*
(0.037)

Solicitor General Invited

-0.047*
(0.026)

Amicus Briefs

0.002
(0.002)

Case Salience Index

0.007***
(0.003)

Attorney Petitioner

0.062***
(0.025)

Constant

2.159***
(0.013)

In(alpha)

-0.510***
(0.014)

Observations
Chi-squared

15654
239.574

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
To further illustrate this relationship, Figure 1 displays the predicted
number of questions asked of attorneys during oral arguments (1986–
2006). We estimated the point estimates (dot) and 95 percent
confidence intervals (whiskers) using results presented in Table 1. In
so doing, we held all other variables at their mean or modal values.
Figure 1 demonstrates that the Justices ask Solicitors General of their
appointing President approximately two fewer questions per case. To
put this in perspective, the expected number of questions Justices direct
toward attorneys of the Presidents who appointed them decreases by
approximately 21 percent. As for when the Supreme Court invites the
Solicitor General to participate, the results in Table 1 clearly indicate
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that Justices are willing to show the Solicitor General more deference.
In other words, Justices are more willing to listen to oral arguments
when the Court has extended an invitation to the Solicitor General to
participate. This probably reflects the fact that when Justices invite the
Solicitor General to participate, they are hoping to obtain valuable
information about the preferences of other political actors.159 As such,
they should be, and are, more deferential to that attorney.
FIGURE 1: The Predicted Number of Questions Asked of Attorneys
During Oral Arguments (1986–2006)160

Focusing on interactions between Justices and the Solicitor General,
the data show that the variable “Actual Solicitor General” is not only in
the correct direction, but also statistically significant as well. It is well
documented that the Solicitor General holds a unique position in the
federal judicial system.161 Thus, the deference given to the actual

159. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role
of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES
215, 217–18, 221–22, 225 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
160. Point estimates (dot) and 95 percent confidence intervals (whiskers) were estimated using
results presented in Table 1. All other variables were held at their mean or modal values.
161. See, e.g., BLACK & OWENS, supra note 7, at 7–9 (discussing reasons for the Solicitor
General’s success).
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Solicitor General is possibly based on the reverence Justices hold for
this position. While it is evident the actual Solicitor General can expect
deferential treatment in front of the Court, this does not hold for
assistant Solicitors General. The variable “Office of Solicitor General”
is in the correct direction, but falls short of reaching traditional levels
of significance. This suggests that assistant Solicitors General are
treated differently than are their bosses—the Actual Solicitor General.
This finding is also consistent with previous work on the Solicitor
General’s relationship with the Court.162
In addition, there is clear evidence that Justices are more deferential
toward litigants who are “Ideologically Compatible” with them. Table
1 shows that this coefficient is both negative and significant—which
suggests that the Justices evince more deference to litigants whose
arguments they ideologically are more likely to accept. This finding is
born out in Figure 1, which illustrates that Justices ask Ideologically
Compatible attorneys 1.5 fewer questions per case. In other words,
when all of the variables are held constant, the number of questions
posed to compatible petitioners or respondents decreases by
approximately 17 percent. While this substantive effect is compelling,
care must be taken when interpreting this finding because our measure
of “Ideologically Compatible” is quite blunt.
Finally, we turn to our control variables. As indicated in Table 1, we
find a positive and significant relationship between a Justice’s
inclination to listen and to whom they are addressing. Holding constant
all other factors, Justices ask petitioners approximately 6 percent more
questions. As for the other two variables—intended to capture the
relative importance of Supreme Court cases—we find mixed results.
On the one hand, the number of amicus briefs supporting a petitioner
or respondent does not significantly affect a Justice’s tendency to listen
to an attorney during oral argument. On the other hand, the salience of
a case—as measured by the Case Salience Index163—leads a Justice to
listen less to the attorneys. The substantive effect of this variable,
however, is minuscule. These two findings suggest that the salience of
a case does not substantially influence a Justice’s propensity for
inquiry. As such, salience does not seem to affect deference.
Taken as a whole, Table 1 and Figure 1 present initial support for the
Listening Hypothesis. Indeed, the Justices are likely to show some
deference to the actual Solicitor General. They are also more likely to
162. See, e.g., id. at 5–6 (discussing the Solicitor General’s influence over the Supreme Court).
163. See Collins & Cooper, supra note 155, at 405 (concluding that salience of a case has a
significant effect on outcomes).
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show such deference to Solicitors General who are appointed by the
same President. Finally, the Justices also show some propensity to
defer to the office of the Solicitor General when the office has been
invited to the arguments.
Next, this Study analyzes the language Justices use when interacting
with the attorneys who appear before the Court. The dependent
variable indicates the percentage of unpleasant or negative words in the
Justices’ questions and comments. More precisely, it is the percentage
of negative words the Justices direct toward attorneys at oral
arguments, which allows this Study to compare how Justices treat
litigants at oral argument. Because the dependent variable is
continuous, this Study models this form of deference with an Ordinary
Least Squares model.
Table 2 and Figure 2 demonstrate that the Justices display more
deference to attorneys representing the Presidents who appointed them.
Indeed, the negative and significant coefficient for Appointing
President demonstrates that, when questioning the attorneys
representing the Presidents who appointed them, Justices use less
unpleasant or negative language. To further illustrate this relationship,
Figure 2 displays the predicted percentage of words that the Justices
use in their questions that are unpleasant or negative during oral
arguments (1986–2006).
We estimated the point estimates (dot) and 95 percent confidence
intervals (whiskers) using results presented in Table 2. This finding
clearly illustrates the substantive impact of this relationship and
indicates that this impact is sizable when compared to the other factors
included in the model. As with our first model, the Justices also use
less unpleasant language when the Supreme Court invites the Solicitor
General to participate. On the other hand, because the Office of Solicitor
General is signed incorrectly and is not statistically insignificant, this
suggests that the Justices do not seem to display more deference toward
attorneys on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General. Taken
together, these findings provide mixed support for our hypothesis that
Justices treat Solicitors General or Assistant Solicitors General
differently than private attorneys during oral arguments.
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TABLE 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regression—Modeling the
Negative Emotive Content of Individual Justices Directed Toward the
Solicitor General
(1) Negativity b/se
Appointing President
Ideological Compatibility

-0.318***
(0.052)
-0.056**
(0.024)

Office of Solicitor General

0.019
(0.042)

Actual Solicitor General

-0.026
(0.063)

Solicitor General Invited

-0.125***
(0.047)

Amicus Briefs

-0.002
(0.004)

Case Salience Index

0.010*
(0.006)

Attorney Petitioner

0.062
(0.042)

Constant

1.367***
(0.024)

Observations
R-squared

15654
0.003

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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FIGURE 2: Predicted Probability of the Negative Emotion of
Questions Asked of Attorneys During Oral Arguments (1986–2006)164

Beyond the Solicitor General variables, there is some evidence that
other factors affect the Justices’ use of unpleasant language toward
attorneys who appear at the Court. First, they clearly use lessunpleasant language when interacting with Ideologically Compatible
attorneys. This suggests that they also show deference to the attorneys
who argue for the side with which the Justice is likely to agree. As with
the number of questions they ask, this finding is intuitive. In addition,
there is not a systematic association between Justices’ use of harsh
language and the number of amicus briefs filed or with whether an
attorney represents the petitioner before the Court. On the other hand,
there is a statistical relationship between cases the public may find
salient—as measured by the Case Salience Index—and how the Justices
treat attorneys. That said, this variable is not substantively significant.
CONCLUSION
Existing literature suggests that the Supreme Court Justices defer to
the Office of the Solicitor General as a signal that the Court defers to the
164. Point estimates (dot) and 95 percent confidence intervals (whiskers) were estimated using
ordinary least squares regression. All other variables were held at their mean or modal values.
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executive branch. But the vast majority of this literature is based solely
on idea that deference manifests itself in whether the Solicitor General
wins before the Court. Such findings might show deference, but wins
are behaviorally equivalent to other reasons why the Solicitor General
may win (e.g., the office has better attorneys, they are considered the
tenth Justice, or they offer highly credible arguments). The findings in
this Article provide a much more nuanced way to understand the degree
to which the Court defers to the Solicitor General and, in turn, the
executive.
Specifically, it is clear that the Justices simply show more deference
to Solicitors General who are appointed by the same President. In fact,
Justices are more likely to allow similarly appointed Solicitors General
to provide more of their own argument because they face fewer
questions from the bench. At the same time, when they do ask
questions, they use less harsh language toward attorneys appearing on
behalf of the federal government. These findings clearly add to the
accepted wisdom that the Court does defer to the Solicitor General and
also provide a measure of deference that goes well beyond the concept
of the Solicitor General simply winning at the Court. Indeed, when
combined with the findings of Johnson et al. (2009) and Black, Treul,
et al. (2011), our analysis begins to provide an explanation for the
mechanism that leads to why the Solicitor General wins more often
before the Court.165 As such, we add an important component to this
vast and important literature in the study of Supreme Court decision
making.
Ultimately, this Article makes two explicit contributions to the
separation of powers literature. First, this literature usually focuses on
the relationship between the President and Congress166 or the Court and

165. See Black, Treul, et al., supra note 8, at 576–79 (discussing results of tests analyzing the
Supreme Court’s use of negative language toward a petitioner during oral argument and the likelihood
of that petitioner winning); Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 256–61 (discussing results of hypothesis
testing which revealed that the attention Supreme Court Justices give at oral argument to one side or
the other strongly affects the case outcome).
166. See, e.g., JON R. BOND & RICHARD FLEISHER, THE PRESIDENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE
ARENA 8–11 (1990) (discussing presidential success in pushing a legislative agenda through
Congress); NIGEL BOWLES, THE WHITE HOUSE AND CAPITOL HILL: THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION 1–3 (1987) (discussing the White House Office of Congressional
Relations, specifically focusing on the Johnson administration); GEORGE EDWARDS III,
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: A SOURCEBOOK 1–3 (1990) (summarizing presidential approval
polling); PAUL C. LIGHT, THE PRESIDENT’S AGENDA: DOMESTIC POLICY CHOICE FROM KENNEDY
TO CLINTON 5–6 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing how Presidents have prioritized their legislative
agendas).

(DO NOT DELETE)

474

2/10/2017 1:43 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 48

Congress.167 Thus, this analysis significantly increases scholarly
understanding of inter-institutional relationships at the federal level
because it focuses on the relationship between the Court and the
President. Second, existing literature often assumes that Justices have
complete information about how Congress and the President want them
to act. This Article argues that this is not the case, and provides
systematic evidence that Justices actively seek information about the
preferences of the current administration through the Solicitor General.
In so doing, we delineate explicit conditions under which the Justices
should be, and are, concerned with how the current administration wants
them to act. The findings shed light on the Court’s decision-making
process as well as on the way that our federal institutions interact with
one another.

167. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?
Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 615–17 (1991) (discussing
the congressional view of the Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence); Rafael Gely & Pablo T.
Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the
State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG., 263, 264 (1990) (discussing the influence
of Congress in Supreme Court decision making); but see Andrew D. Martin, Congressional
Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361, 376 (2001) (discussing
the influence of separation of powers concerns on Congress).

